Separation of Powers in India: Role of Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary Explained



SEPARATION OF POWER:

LEGISLATURE, EXECUTIVE & JUDICIARY


Author- Vanya Agrawal, B.A.LLB(Hons), CMP Degree College, University of Allahabad, Prayagraj

Abstract

 

This article delves into the doctrine of Separation of Powers, tracing its historical roots and examining its application within the Indian constitutional framework. While India avoids a rigid division, it maintains a delicate balance between the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Through key case laws and current developments like the Electoral Bonds verdict, that highlights the risks of institutional overreach and the importance of accountability. It argues that sustaining a vibrant democracy requires not just a division of power, but ongoing vigilance, transparency, and mutual respect among the pillars of governance to prevent the concentration of authority in any single branch.

 

Introduction

 

What happens when the judge becomes the lawmaker, the lawmaker starts interpreting judgments, and the executive begins punishing without a trial? The balance collapses — and so does democracy. That is why the doctrine of Separation of Powers, rooted in the Latin maxim triaspolitica[1], remains essential to any constitutional democracy. A simple yet powerful principle given by Montesquieu“power should be a check to power”[2]— captures exactly why this doctrine remains the backbone of constitutional democracy.

 

Though the Indian Constitution does not enforce a strict separation, it reflects the doctrine’s spirit through well-defined roles. The three branches — Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary — are designed to function independently while maintaining mutual respect and accountability. Article 50[3], under the Directive Principles of State Policy says, “the state shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive”. Though not enforceable, it reflects a constitutional ideal meant to protect judicial impartiality.

 

The importance of separation becomes undeniable when institutions begin to step into each other’s shoes. When the executive resists judicial oversight or delays appointments, or when courts intervene due to legislative inaction, it’s not just a functional shift — it’s a constitutional imbalance. Incidents like the Pegasus surveillance case[4] reminds us that institutional harmony isn’t automatic; it needs constant protection.

 

Ever wondered how this doctrine actually works in law and life? Then let’s trace its evolution from political theory to constitutional practice.

 

The Doctrine Of Separation Of Power: Origin And Evolution

The idea that power must be divided is as old as political thought itself.Aristotle observed that a well-ordered state must separate its deliberative, executive, and judicial functions[5]. But it was Montesquieu, centuries later, who transformed that observation into a constitutional doctrine. In his work The Spirit of Laws[6], he argued that liberty is endangered when all powers rest with a single entity. True freedom survives only when power restrains power — not through conflict, but through thoughtful distribution.

 

The doctrine wasn’t born of idealism, but distrust of unchecked authority. History had shown — when one body held all powers, justice and neutrality are the first casualties. The legal maxim nemo debetessejudex in propria causa[7]— no one should be a judge in their own cause — reflects the same fear.

 

The United States Constitution was the first to implement a rigid separation of powers, with each organ operating in watertight compartments. Other democracies followed, each adapting

the doctrine to their socio-political realities.

 

India, in contrast, chose balance over rigidity. Our Constitution reflects not a mechanical division, but a thoughtful structure that allows cooperation without compromising independence. Though ancient in origin, the doctrine remains relevant — not a rigid formula, but a flexible safeguard against the concentration of power.

 

To understand how this principle operates in practice, we must first examine the role and responsibilities of each branch — beginning with the Legislature.

 

Role of the Legislature: Making the Law

 

The first organ in the constitutional chain of power is the Legislature — the body that transforms public demands into enforceable law. At the Union level, Parliament exercises this power under Articles 245 and 246[8], the constitution divides the subjects between the Union and the States through the Seventh Schedule[9].

 

But law-making is just one part – the Legislature also debates on policies, scrutinises the Executive, and sets national direction. Every bill introduced, every budget passed, and every motion debated reflects democracy in action.

 

A powerful reflection of this balance was seen in the case where the Legislature, seeking transparency in judicial appointments, passed the NJAC Act[10] with near-unanimous support across political parties. The Executive followed through. But when challenged, the Judiciary struck it down, holding that it violates the independence of the judiciary. This moment became a reminder that even with shared intent, no organ may cross its constitutional limits.

 

The Legislature, then, is not just a beginning — it is the pulse of democracy. Once it lays down the law, the Executive puts it into action.

 

Role of the Executive: Enforcing the Law

 

If the Legislature provides the blueprint, the Executive gives it life. It is responsible for the day-to-day governance and implementing laws. In India, this power vests in the President under Article 53[11], and in the Governor at the state level under Article 154[12], but in practice, it is exercised by the executive branch through elected officials.

 

The Executive enforces laws passed by the Legislature, executes schemes, and ensures the machinery of government runs smoothly — from delivering welfare to maintaining law and order. Its actions must reflect legislative intent and remain subject to judicial review.

 

For instance, during COVID-19 pandemic, the Executive issued swift directions under the Disaster Management Act, 2005[13], enacted by the Legislature. The Judiciary later intervened to ensure these actions respected fundamental rights — a practical example of checks and balances.

 

Thus, the Executive serves as a link between the law and the people — active, visible, and accountable. Now let’s talk about Judiciary which ensures that all the actions remain within the set boundaries.

 

Role of the Judiciary: Interpreting the Law

 

While the Executive enforces the law, the Judiciary — silent yet powerful — ensures those actions remain within constitutional limits. It interprets laws, resolves disputes, maintains checks and balances, and protects citizens when state actions defy justice.

 

In India, this authority flows from Article 124[14] (Supreme Court) and Article 214[15] (High Courts), with Article 141[16] ensuring that decisions of the Supreme Court apply uniformly across the country. Though not explicitly mentioned, judicial review is a firmly established power that allows courts to invalidate legislative or executive actions that breach constitutional provisions. The maximUbi jus ibiremedium[17]— where there is a right, there is a remedy — perfectly encapsulates this role.

 

A notable instance of judicial oversight was seen after the 2019 Hyderabad encounter, where four accused were killed in police custody. In response, the Judiciary directed an independent inquiry and reiterated safeguards to prevent custodial violence. In the absence of updated legislative measures, these directions served as a constitutional reminder that justice must never come at the cost of the rule of law.

 

The Judiciary, then, acts not as a ruler but as a constitutional compass, keeping governance aligned with justice. To understand how this balance plays out in India, we must now explore how separation of powers is uniquely adapted to our constitutional framework.

 

Separation of Powers: The Indian Model in a Global Context

 

       Fusion or Division? – The Indian Approach

 

India’s Constitution doesn’t build silos — it builds channels. The Executive rises from the Legislature, debates in it, and answers to it. The Judiciary holds its ground, yet often steps in when gaps appear in law or enforcement. This isn’t chaos — it’s controlled overlap, where power is not locked in boxes, but woven into a working balance. India’s framers didn’t mimic—they composed a separation suited to diversity, disruption, and democratic depth.

 

       Comparative Glimpse – Global Models

 

Across the globe, the same doctrine plays out in different scripts.

 

     In the United States, separation is strict, the President can reject (veto[18]), Congress can inquire, and courts can invalidate any law.

 

     In the United Kingdom, it’s more like a handshake — where Parliament and Executive often wear the same coat.

 

     In France, a semi-presidential democracy, executive power is split between a President and a Prime Minister.

 

India borrows from all three but bows to none — choosing instead a hybrid system that prizes institutional respect over institutional isolation. We will now analyze important court rulings that clarify this balance of powers.

 

Landmark Cases on Separation of Powers

 

Several key judicial decisions have shaped India’s doctrine of separation of powers by affirming the limits of each branch and ensuring accountability:

 

1.      KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225[19]:

Facts:KesavanandaBharati, a seer, challenged Parliament’s authority to amend the Constitution, particularly where it threatened fundamental rights.

Held: The Supreme Court introduced the “basic structure” doctrine, declaring that while Parliament can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its core features—ensuring that judicial independence and constitutional supremacy are preserved.

 

2.      Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1980) 3 SCC 625[20]:

Facts: Constitutional amendments attempted to give Parliament overriding powers, allowing it to limit fundamental rights freely.

Held: The Court invalidated these changes, reaffirming that the Constitution mandates a balance between the powers of the Legislature and the rights of citizens, thereby upholding the idea of separation.

 

3.      S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87[21]:

Facts: The method of judicial appointments was challenged due to excessive Executive involvement.

Held: The court emphasised transparent judicial appointments to prevent Executive interference..

 

4.      L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261[22]:

Facts: The Executive had established tribunals with the intention of bypassing the regular judiciary.

Held: The Court held that such tribunals must still be subject to judicial review, reinforcing the Judiciary’s role as the final interpreter of the Constitution.

 

5.      I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1[23]:

Facts: Several laws were placed in the Ninth Schedule[24] to shield them from judicial review.

Held: The Court ruled that even such laws can be struck down if they infringe upon fundamental rights, thus checking legislative overreach and preserving constitutional checks and balances.

 

These cases collectively ensure that no branch exceeds its constitutional limits, keeping power balanced and preventing misuse. Next, we will examine how these principles operate within India’s governance system.

 

Institutional Overlaps & Present-Day Challenges

 

In a democracy as layered as India’s, the boundaries between the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary often intersect. While some overlap is essential for coordination, unchecked encroachment distorts the constitutional equilibrium. The 2024 Electoral Bonds verdict highlighted this tension—where the Executive’s use of a money bill[25] to push through political funding reforms, bypassing the Rajya Sabha, was struck down by the Supreme Court.

Critics termed it judicial overreach; others viewed it as necessary correction where legislative scrutiny was circumvented. The Judiciary’s role in such moments walks a fine line—balancing restraint with constitutional duty.

 

The challenge lies not merely in separation, but in ensuring each branch functions within its mandate without paralyzing governance. When one organ hesitates or exceeds, another often steps in—not out of ambition, but in response to democratic necessity. The debate today is not about power, but about its proportion and purpose.

 

Conclusion

 

“Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely.”[26] Lord Acton’s timeless warning echoes louder than ever today. History has shown us that when power goes unchecked, even well-intentioned institutions can drift toward authoritarianism.

 

Separation of powers isn’t just a fundamental concept—it’s the backbone of a healthy democracy, designed to prevent any single branch from gaining unchecked control.

 

To preserve this balance, a few key measures stand out: promoting transparency in decision-making, ensuring merit-based and transparent judicial appointments, and strengthening independent oversight bodies. Encouraging respectful dialogue among the branches can also help maintain their distinct roles without conflict.

 

Perhaps it’s time we must ask ourselves: In an era where the boundary lines of power often begin to blur, how can we ensure that the very guardians of democracy do not become its greatest threat?

 

References

 

1.      Constitution of India, 1950: https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india

2.      Indian Kanoon: https://indiankanoon.org

3.      Encyclopædia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/topic/separation-of-powers

4.      Live Law: https://www.livelaw.in

5.      Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_powers



[1]Triaspolitica (Latin for “three powers”).

[2]CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748), available at https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch17s9.html (last visited June 9, 2025).

[3]India Const. art. 50.

[4] Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India, WP (Crl) 314/2021 (India), https://indianexpress.com/article/india/sc-pegasus-israeli-spyware-nation-security-9972255/ (last visited June 9, 2025).

[5] Aristotle, Politics bk. IV, Part XIV (trans. Benjamin Jowett, ca. 350 BCE), available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/aristotle-s-politics (last visited June 9, 2025).

[6] CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748).

[7]Nemo debetessejudex in propria causa (Latin for “no one should be a judge in their own cause”).

[8]India Const. arts. 245, 246.

[9] India Const. Sched. IX, list III.

[10] The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, No. 40 of 2014 (India), enacted Dec. 31, 2014, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2142?sam_handle=123456789/1362 (last visited June 9, 2025).

[11]India Const. art. 53.

[12]India Const. art. 154.

[13]Disaster Management Act, No. 53 of 2005 (India), enacted Dec. 23, 2005, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2045?sam_handle=1 (last visited June 9, 2025).

[14]India Const. art. 124.

[15]India Const. art. 214.

[16]India Const. art. 141.

[17]Ubi jus ibiremedium (Latin for “where there is a right, there is a remedy”).

[18]Veto, Britannica Dictionary, https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/veto (last visited June 9, 2025).

[19]KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (per Sikri, C.J., majority) (India).

[20]Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 (per Chandrachud, C.J., majority) (India).

[21]S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp. SCC 87, 150 (per Bhagwati, J., majority) (India).

[22] L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 (per Ahmadi, C.J., majority) (India).

[23] I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1, 58 (per Sabharwal, C.J., unanimous) (India).

[24] India Consti. Sched. IX.

[25] India Const. art. 110; Money Bill, Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/money-bill (last visited June 9, 2025).

[26]Lord Acton, Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), reprinted in Essays on Freedom and Power 364 (1948).


Separation of Powers in Indian Constitution

Legislature Executive Judiciary in India

Montesquieu Trias Politica Doctrine

Article 50 of Indian Constitution

Kesavananda Bharati case

NJAC Act and Judicial Independence

Judicial Review in India

Electoral Bonds Verdict Supreme Court

Checks and Balances Indian Democracy

Role of Judiciary Legislature Executive

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